How long did shermans march to the sea take




















Sherman abandoned his supply line and marched across Georgia to the Atlantic Ocean to prove to the Confederate population that its government could not protect the people from invaders. He practiced psychological warfare; he believed that by marching an army across the state he would demonstrate to the world that the Union had a power the Confederacy could not resist. Courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration.

Farragut closed Mobile Bay in August , the Alabama port no longer held any military significance. Rather, he decided to proceed southeast toward Savannah or Charleston. He carefully studied census records to determine which route could provide food for his men and forage for his animals. Although U. Grant that the campaign was possible in winter.

In early October he began a raid toward Chattanooga, Tennessee, in an effort to draw Sherman back over ground the two sides had fought for since May. But instead of tempting Sherman to battle, Hood turned his army west and marched into Alabama, abandoning Georgia to Union forces. Apparently, Hood hoped that if he invaded Tennessee, Sherman would be forced to follow.

Sherman, however, had anticipated this strategy and had sent Major General George H. Thomas to Nashville to deal with Hood.

With Georgia cleared of the Confederate army, Sherman, facing only scattered cavalry, was free to move south. Sherman divided his approximately 60, troops into two roughly equal wings. The right wing was under Oliver O. Peter J.

Osterhaus commanded the Fifteenth Corps, and Francis P. Blair Jr. The left wing was commanded by Henry W. Slocum, with the Fourteenth Corps under Jefferson C. Davis and the Twentieth Corps under Alpheus S. Judson Kilpatrick led the cavalry. Sherman had about 2, supply wagons and ambulances. Before the army left Atlanta, the general issued an order outlining the rules of the march, but soldiers often ignored the restrictions on foraging.

The two wings advanced by separate routes, generally staying twenty miles to forty miles apart. The right wing headed for Macon , the left wing in the direction of Augusta , before the two commands turned and bypassed both cities.

They now headed for the state capital at Milledgeville. Although William J. Hardee had overall command in Georgia, with his headquarters at Savannah, neither he nor Governor Joseph E. The first came east of Macon at the factory town of Griswoldville on November 22, when Georgia militia faced Union infantry with disastrous results.

The Confederates suffered men killed or wounded in a one-sided battle that left about 62 casualties on the Union side. The second battle occurred on the Ogeechee River twelve miles below Savannah. Union infantry under William B. Read more about it! The information in this guide focuses on primary source materials found in the digitized historic newspapers from the digital collection Chronicling America. The timeline below highlights important dates related to this topic and a section of this guide provides some suggested search strategies for further research in the collection.

Search this Guide Search. This guide provides access to material related to "Sherman's March to the Sea" in the Chronicling America digital collection of historic newspapers. No one was thinking beyond the immediate horizon. Without any contrary information from Wheeler, Hardee wrongly assumed that the Federal line of march was well to the northeast, leaving the railroad clear from Gordon to the coast.

Orders to that effect were issued to the various units around the city. Taking his own cue, Hardee packed up, and on the evening of November 21 headed for the coast. The citizen-soldiers were thrown back with serious losses.

Even as that combat was unfolding, Taylor arrived at Macon. Wright, second-in-command of state forces as president of the Georgia Senate, activated a clause in the law empowering him to intervene.

He took control of the militia east of the Oconee River and ordered it to Macon. The one Confederate action that actually stopped Sherman went virtually unnoticed at this time. This action was undertaken entirely on the initiative of officers on the scene, who reported to Savannah, where Hardee was headed from Macon.

Wheeler, on a self-appointed mission to protect Augusta, passed behind the defenders without lending any significant aid, leaving the little force very much on its own.

On the night of November 25, Howard used his superior numbers to flank the defenders and force them to retreat. That same day Braxton Bragg reached Augusta. He also suspended a law restricting the use of militia reserves to their own states, so that there would be nothing to hinder South Carolina units from coming into Georgia.

Bragg and Hardee turned their attention to protecting Augusta and Savannah. After reaching Montgomery, Ala. There was one last opportunity to stop Sherman before he reached Savannah. Sherman placed one corps to flank the position from the north and another across the river to the south.

On December 4 Hardee sent his veteran commander Maj. Lafayette McLaws to the post for an assessment. The last best chance to stop Sherman had been abandoned without a fight. Once Wheeler drew close to Augusta, he came under the jurisdiction of Bragg, who used the cavalry to blunt Federal thrusts toward the city. The result was a series of mounted clashes between Wheeler and his Federal counterpart Kilpatrick that climaxed at Waynesboro on December 4.

Beauregard moved his headquarters to Charleston. On the night of December 20, with Sherman well away from the front in Hilton Head and most of the Union troops besieging Savannah in a purely defensive posture, the Confederates evacuated the city. The Jefferson Davis scheme to subvert Sherman in his mission failed in every aspect.

Once Hood was permitted to pursue an independent agenda, he completely removed his army from the Georgia arena. Hood failed to realize that the Union strength remaining in Tennessee was sufficiently large enough to stop him outside Nashville, and Sherman never gave a second thought to turning back.

When P. Beauregard was not ineffectively carping at John B. Hood, he seemingly managed to be anywhere except where he was most needed. Once Beauregard was finally in a position to influence events, his determination to preserve military assets at all costs doomed Savannah. Hardee, Taylor and then Bragg limited their participation to narrowly focused defensive measures, leaving larger strategic issues hanging.



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