The second thing these tests reveal is that the difference between Boston and London you might not be the nature of the particular atoms or cells involved, but about continuity. The Cell Replacement Test might have left you intact because it changed you gradually , one cell at a time. This could also explain why the teletransporter might be a murder machine—London you has no continuity with your previous life.
Could it be that anytime you relocate your brain, or disassemble your atoms all at once, transfer your brain data onto a new brain, etc. A few years ago, my late grandfather, in his 90s and suffering from dementia, pointed at a picture on the wall of himself as a six-year-old.
He was right. But come on. It seems ridiculous that the six-year-old in the picture and the extremely old man standing next to me could be the same person. Those two people had nothing in common. And they shared almost no common brain data at all.
Any year-old man on the street is much more similar to my grandfather than that six-year-old. If similarity were enough to define you, Boston you and London you, who are identical , would be the same person. The thing that my grandfather shared with the six-year-old in the picture is something he shared with no one else on Earth—they were connected to each other by a long, unbroken string of continuous existence.
As an old man, he may not know anything about that six-year-old boy, but he knows something about himself as an year-old, and that year-old might know a bunch about himself as an year-old. As a year-old, he knew a ton about him as a year-old, and when he was seven, he was a pro on himself as a 6-year-old.
You may have repaired it hundreds of times over the years, replacing wood chip after wood chip, until one day, you realize that not one piece of material from the original boat is still part of it.
So is that still your boat? If you named your boat Polly the day you bought it, would you change the name now? It would still be Polly, right? In this way, what you are is not really a thing as much as a story, or a progression , or one particular theme of person. As his cells and memories come and go, as every wood chip in his canoe changes again and again, maybe the single common thread that ties it all together is his soul. After examining a human from every physical and mental angle throughout the post, maybe the answer this whole time has been the much less tangible Soul Theory.
The way I actually feel right now is completely off-balance. You can buy this post as a PDF for printing and offline reading here. Sources Very few of the ideas or thought experiments in this post are my original thinking. I read and listened to a bunch of personal identity philosophy this week and gathered my favorite parts together for the post.
And a fascinating and related video For a while now, my favorite YouTube channel has been Kurzgesagt. They make one amazing five-minute animated video a month on the exact kinds of topics I love to write about. I highly recommend subscribing.
I focused on what the self is, they explored what life itself is. Check it out:. Writing this post has made me obsessed with thinking about what would happen if I cloned myself. My first instinct is that we could be teammates in life and it would solve all my problems.
It sounds pretty great. Disappointing outcome. What if we did both at once, destroying one hemisphere and transplanting the other? Then too, the one who got the transplanted hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and would be you according to the psychological-continuity view.
But now suppose that both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head. The two recipients—call them Lefty and Righty—will each be psychologically continuous with you. The psychological-continuity view as we have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you.
It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. But that cannot be: if you and Lefty are one and you and Righty are one, Lefty and Righty cannot be two. And yet they are: there are indisputably two people after the operation. One thing cannot be numerically identical with two things that are distinct from each other. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: a straight contradiction.
Psychological-continuity theorists have proposed two different solutions to this problem. What we think of as you is really two people, who are now exactly similar and located in the same place, doing the same things and thinking the same thoughts. The surgeons merely separate them Lewis , Noonan —42; Perry offers a more complex variant. For each person, there is such a thing as her first half: an entity just like the person only briefer, like the first half of a meeting.
They are like two roads that coincide for a stretch and then fork, sharing some of their spatial parts but not others. At the places where the roads overlap, they are just like one road. Likewise, the idea goes, at the times before the operation when Lefty and Righty share their temporal parts, they are just like one person. Whether we really are composed of temporal parts, however, is disputed. Its consequences are explored further in section 8. The other solution to the fission problem abandons the intuitive claim that psychological continuity by itself suffices for us to persist.
It says, rather, that a past or future being is you only if she is then psychologically continuous with you and no other being is. There is no circularity in this. We need not know the answer to the persistence question in order to know how many people there are at any one time; that comes under the population question. This means that neither Lefty nor Righty is you.
They both come into existence when your cerebrum is divided. If both your cerebral hemispheres are transplanted, you cease to exist—though you would survive if only one were transplanted and the other destroyed. Fission is death. Shoemaker 85, Parfit ; 6f. That looks like the opposite of what we should expect: if your survival depends on the functioning of your brain because that is what underlies psychological continuity , then the more of that organ we preserve, the greater ought to be your chance of surviving.
In fact the non-branching view implies that you would perish if one of your hemispheres were transplanted and the other left in place: you can survive hemispherectomy only if the hemisphere to be removed is first destroyed. This seems mysterious. Why should an event that would normally preserve your existence bring it to an end if accompanied by a second such event—one having no causal effect on the first?
If your brain is to be divided, why do we need to destroy half of it in order to save you? For discussion, see Noonan 12—15 and ch. The problem is especially acute if brain-state transfer counts as psychological continuity. In that case, even copying your total brain state to another brain without doing you any physical or psychological harm would kill you.
The non-branching view makes the What matters? Faced with the prospect of having one of your hemispheres transplanted, there is no evident reason to prefer having the other destroyed. Most of us would rather have both preserved, even if they go into different heads. Yet on the non-branching view that is to prefer death over continued existence. This leads Parfit and others to say that that is precisely what we ought to prefer. We have no reason to want to continue existing, at least for its own sake.
What you have reason to want is that there be someone in the future who is psychologically continuous with you, whether or not she actually is you. The usual way to achieve this is to continue existing yourself, but the fission story shows that this is not necessary.
Likewise, even the most selfish person has a reason to care about the welfare of the beings who would result from her undergoing fission, even if, as the non-branching view implies, neither would be her. In the fission case, the sorts of practical concerns you ordinarily have for yourself apply to someone other than you. This suggests more generally that facts about who is who have no practical importance. All that matters practically is who is psychologically continuous with whom.
Lewis and Parfit debate whether the multiple-occupancy view can preserve the conviction that identity is what matters practically. Another objection to psychological-continuity views is that they rule out our being biological organisms Carter , Ayers —, Snowdon , Olson 80f.
This is because no sort of psychological continuity appears to be either necessary or sufficient for a human organism to persist. Human organisms have brute-physical persistence conditions. If your brain were transplanted, the one who ended up with that organ would be uniquely psychologically continuous with you and this continuity would be continuously physically realized.
On any psychological-continuity view, she would be you: the person would go with her transplanted brain. But no organism would go with its transplanted brain. The operation would simply move an organ from one organism to another. So it seems, anyway. It follows that if you were an organism, you would stay behind with an empty head. Even though this is never going to happen, it shows that according to psychological-continuity views we have a property that no organism has, namely possibly moving from one organism to another by brain transplant.
Again, a human organism could continue existing in an irreversible vegetative state with no psychological continuity. If you were an organism, you could too. But according to psychological-continuity views you could not. It follows that human animals have a property that we lack, namely possibly surviving as a vegetable. But a healthy, adult human organism seems a paradigm case of a thinking being. If human organisms can think, yet as psychological-continuity views imply we are not organisms, three difficulties arise.
First, you are one of two intelligent beings sitting there and reading this entry. More generally, there are two thinking beings wherever we thought there was just one. Second, the organism would not merely think in some way or other, but would presumably be psychologically indistinguishable from you.
In that case it cannot be true that all people or even all human people persist by virtue of psychological continuity. Some—those that are organisms—would have brute-physical persistence conditions. Third, it becomes hard to see how you could know whether you were a nonanimal person with psychological persistence conditions or an animal person with brute-physical ones.
If you thought you were the nonanimal, the organism would use the same reasoning to conclude that it was too. For all you could ever know, it seems, you might be the one making this mistake. We can make this epistemic problem more vivid by imagining a three-dimensional duplicating machine.
The process causes temporary unconsciousness but is otherwise harmless. Two beings wake up, one in each box. The boxes are indistinguishable. Because each being will have the same apparent memories and perceive identical surroundings, each will think, for the same reasons, that he or she is you.
But only one will be right. Suppose the technicians who work the machine are sworn to secrecy and immune to bribes. Did I do the things I seem to remember doing? Am I a nonanimal that would go with its transplanted brain, or an animal that would stay behind with an empty head? The most popular defense of the psychological-continuity view against this objection is to say that, despite sharing our brains and showing all the outward signs of consciousness and intelligence, human organisms do not think and are not conscious.
Thinking animals are not a problem for psychological-continuity views for the simple reason that there are none Shoemaker 92—97, Lowe 1, Johnston 55; Baker is a subtle variant. If human organisms cannot be conscious, it would seem to follow that no biological organism of any sort could have any mental properties at all. Shoemaker argues that this follows from the functionalist theory of mind , , Another option is to concede that human organisms are psychologically indistinguishable from us, but try to explain how we can still know that we are not those organisms.
The best-known proposal of this sort focuses on personhood and first-person reference. It says that not just any being with mental properties of the sort that you and I have—rationality and self-consciousness, for instance—counts as a person. A person must also persist by virtue of psychological continuity. It follows that human animals are not people thus solving the second problem, about personhood. So the organism is not mistaken about which thing it is: it has no first-person beliefs about itself at all.
And you are not mistaken either. You can know that you are not the animal thinking your thoughts because it is not a person and personal pronouns never refer to nonpeople thus solving the third, epistemic problem.
See Noonan , , Olson ; for a different approach based on epistemic principles see Brueckner and Buford Or one could say that human organisms have psychological persistence conditions.
Despite appearances, the transplant operation would not move your brain from one organism to another, but would cut an organism down to the size of a brain, move it across the room, and then give it new parts to replace the ones it lost—presumably destroying the animal into which the brain is implanted.
This may be the view of Wiggins , and McDowell , and is unequivocally endorsed by Madden ; see also Langford , Olson — None of these objections arise on animalism, the view that we are organisms.
This does not imply that all organisms, or even all human organisms, are people: as we saw earlier, human embryos and animals in a persistent vegetative state may not count as people. Being a person may be only a temporary property of you, like being a student. Nor does animalism imply that all people are organisms. It is consistent with the existence of wholly inorganic people: gods or angels or conscious robots. It does not say that being an animal is part of what it is to be a person a view defended in Wiggins and Wollheim ch.
Animalism leaves the answer to the personhood question entirely open. Assuming that organisms persist by virtue of some sort of brute-physical continuity, animalism implies a version of the brute-physical view. Some endorse a brute-physical view without saying that we are animals.
They say that we are our bodies Thomson , or that our identity through time consists in the identity of our bodies Ayer This has been called the bodily criterion of personal identity. It is obscure, and its relation to animalism is uncertain. Most versions of the brute-physical view imply that human people have the same persistence conditions as certain nonpeople, such as dogs.
And it implies that our persistence conditions differ from those of immaterial people, if they are possible. It follows that there are no persistence conditions for people as such. Baker objects strenuously to this. The most common objection to brute-physical views is the repugnance of their implication that you would stay behind if your brain were transplanted e.
Unger ; for an important related objection see Johnston , In other words, brute-physical views are unattractive in just the way that psychological-continuity views are attractive. Animalists generally concede the force of this, but take it to be outweighed by other considerations. First, animalism avoids the too-many-thinkers problem. Second, it is compatible with our beliefs about who is who in real life. Every actual case in which we take someone to survive or perish is a case where a human organism does so.
Psychological-continuity views, by contrast, conflict with the appearance that each of us was once a foetus. When we see an ultrasound picture of a week-old foetus, we ordinarily think we are seeing something that will, if all goes well, be born, learn to speak, and eventually become an adult human person.
Yet none of us is in any way psychologically continuous with a week-old foetus. Suppose you had a tumor that would kill you unless your brain were replaced with a healthy donated organ. This would have grave side-effects: it would destroy your memories, plans, preferences, and other mental properties. It may not be clear whether you could survive such a thing. Maybe the operation could save your life, though at great cost. We cannot confidently rule this out even if the new brain gave you memories, plans, and preferences from the donor.
A brain transplant might be metaphysically analogous to a liver transplant. The debate between psychological-continuity and brute-physical views cannot be settled without considering more general matters outside of personal identity. For instance, psychological-continuity theorists need to explain why human organisms are unable to think as we do.
This will require an account of the nature of mental properties. Or if human organisms can think, they must explain how we can know that we are not those organisms. This will turn on how the reference of personal pronouns and proper names works, or on the nature of knowledge.
Some general metaphysical views suggest that there is no unique right answer to the persistence question. The best-known example is the ontology of temporal parts mentioned in section 5. It says that for every period of time when you exist, short or long, there is a temporal part of you that exists only then. This gives us many likely candidates for being you—that is, many different beings now sitting there and reading this.
Suppose you are a material thing, and that we know what determines your spatial boundaries. But that stage is a part of a vast number of temporally extended objects Hudson ch. For instance, it is a part of a being whose temporal boundaries are determined by relations of psychological continuity Section 4 among its stages. That is, one of the beings thinking your current thoughts is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is psychologically continuous with each of the others and with no other stage.
If this is what you are, then you persist by virtue of psychological continuity. Your current stage is also a part of a being whose temporal boundaries are determined by relations of psychological connectedness. That is, one of the beings now thinking your thoughts is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is psychologically connected with each of the others and to no other stage. This may not be the same as the first being, as some stages may be psychologically continuous with your current stage but not psychologically connected with it.
If this is what you are, then psychological connectedness is necessary and sufficient for you to persist Lewis Some even say that you are your current stage itself Sider a, — And there would be many other candidates.
The temporal-parts ontology implies that each of us shares our current thoughts with countless beings that diverge from one another in the past or future. If this were true, which of these things should we be? But these words would be unlikely to succeed in referring to just one sort of thing—to only one of the many candidates on each occasion of utterance.
There would probably be some indeterminacy of reference, so that each such utterance referred ambiguously to many different candidates. That would make it indeterminate what things, and even what sort of things, we are. And insofar as the candidates have different histories and different persistence conditions, it would be indeterminate when we came into being and what it takes for us to persist Sider b. Some material in this entry appeared previously in E.
Stich and T. Warfield, Oxford: Blackwell, The Problems of Personal Identity 2. Understanding the Persistence Question 3. Accounts of Our Persistence 4. Psychological-Continuity Views 5. Wednesday, February 12, -- PM. If you mean serious, on-topic queries about the radio show's content, then I have yet to see any from you to which I might offer an answer.
And I certainly can discern no answers relevant to the conversation issuing from your posts. As for your seemingly disparaging comment that my colleagues "Must have better answers than do you; HGN ", a I would not know and b I can't tell since you have not offered any for purposes of comparison.
My comments here are not -- as you imply -- to sell books; I comment because I was invited to discuss the content of the book by the hosts. I expect intelligent conversation on topic -- not an apparent free-flow of non sequiturs. By the way, if you had listened to my talk on radio or read the book that appears to infatuate you, you might realize that I find science useful but quite dogmatic and overly restrictive as a world view.
I kindly suggest you stick with your original stated intent and move on to other discussions. Skip to main content. Search form Search. Memory and the Self. Kenneth Taylor. Related Shows Memory and the Self Jan 26, The criminal justice system often relies on the testimony of eyewitnesses to get convictions. Reading, Narrative, and the Self Nov 28, Reading is a lot of fun, especially narrative fiction — everyone loves a good story.
Self and Self-Presentation Dec 06, We craft personal brands or images to accompany or represent ourselves in various situations. The Limits of Self-Knowledge Oct 06, Descartes considered the mind to be fully self-transparent; that is, he thought that we need only introspect to know what goes on inside our own minds.
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